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Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the on-going China-US trade war, similar to the 
Thucydides Trap in terms of competing for global economic dominance. It analyzes what the US 
attempts to achieve through the trade war and why China has been refusing the reciprocal trade 
relations urged by President Trump. It also identifies social and economic changes in American 
society, which motivate President Trump to impose punitive tariffs on Chinese goods. It 
emphasizes that the trade war is asymmetric and China will definitely suffer more losses than the 
US if the trade war escalates further. At the end of the paper, it suggests that, to avoid the 
devastating result of the Thucydides Trap, China should further open its domestic market to 
American companies and actively pursue negotiations with the US for resolving the dispute. 
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1. Sino-US Trade War: a New form of the Thucydides Trap 
The Ancient Greek historian Thucydides observed that when a rising power threatens to displace 
the existing power, war is almost inevitable. This is so-called “Thucydides Trap.” In the last 500 
years, among 16 cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling one, 12 ended in 
war.1 With $19.4 trillion GDP, the US remains the top economic superpower in the World. After 
the rapid growth of the last few decades, China has been catching up and has substantially 
shortened its distance from the US. In 2017, China’s GDP amounted to $12.8 trillion, about 60% 
of US GDP. If China could continue its high economic growth, it would be highly likely that in 
twenty years the Chinese economy would surpass that of the US and turn into the largest 
economy in the world.  
Given its rapid economic growth and the gigantic size,, China appears to be a viable challenger 
to  the US’s dominance in the world economy. The surging US trade deficit with China, as well 
as the ambitions of “Made in China 2025” (announced in May 2015), further reinforce concerns 
of the US about the threat of China’s rising economic power. The ongoing Sino-US trade war is 
not a military conflict, but rather is similar to the Thucydides Trap hypothesis in terms of 
competing for global economic dominance. The trade war launched by the Trump administration 
is a rational response of the US to the rising economic power of China. The Trump 
administration expects to use a trade war to rewrite the trade rules, force China to further open its 
market to American firms, and abandon unfair practices distorting the competition between 
American and Chinese firms, and so that the US could compete with China on a level playing 
field. 
On April 3, 2018, on the order of President Trump, the Office of the US Trade Representative 
(USTR) released a list of $50 billion in Chinese products subject to a 25% punitive tariff. The list 
covers more than 1,300 categories of products, ranging from hi-tech products to consumer goods 
such as diswashers, televisions and automobiles. The measures follow the 301 investigation led 
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  Allison, G (2017). “The Thucydides Trap”. Foreign Policy, 9 June 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-
trap/	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by Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer on China’s unfair trade practices, (notably forced 
transfer of American technology and intellectual property).2 
The USTR actions officially started the trade war with China. Just a few hours after the USTR 
released the tariff hit list, the Chinese government hit back at the US with the same tariffs on $50 
billion of American goods, including soybeans, car and chemicals.3 The almost immediate 
response signified that Sino-US trade relations have entered tit-for-tat mode. This is the first 
round of the emerging trade war. 
In May and June of 2018, trade delegates of the two countries negotiated in Washington DC and 
Beijing, but failed to make any significant progress. On Sept. 17, President Trump escalated the 
trade war by ordering the USTR to levy a 10% tariff on an additional $200 billion in Chinese 
goods.4 In response to the second wave of tariffs, the Chinese government vowed to fight back 
with both quantitative and qualitative measures. On Sept. 18, 2018, the Chinese government 
announced that it would charge 10% to 5% tariffs on an additional $60 billion American goods.5 
That was the second round of the trade war.  
The trade war is asymmetric. In 2017, China imported $130 billion American products.6 After 
the first two rounds of fighting, the Chinese government had marked $110 American goods for  
retaliatory tariffs. If the tit-for-tat trade war continues and goes into the third round, only $20 
billion in American goods could be targeted. On the other hand, the US imported $505 billion in 
Chinese products in 2017.7 The Trump administration has designated $250 billion worth of 
Chinese products, about half of US imports from China, for the levying of tariffs. Without doubt, 
the US would have more leverage than the Chinese government if the tit-for-tat trade war were to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 USTR (2018), USTR Issues Tariffs on Chinese Products on Responses to Unfair Trade Practices, 3 April 2018. 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/june/ustr-issues-tariffs-chinese-products 
3 Chinese Ministry of Commerce (2018). “The list of American goods for tariffs”. 
4 White House (2018). Statement from the President, Sept. 17, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-
from-the-president-4/ 
5Chinese	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  (2018).	  关于对原产于美国的部分商品加征关税的公告，	  Sept.	  18,	  2018.	  
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201809/20180902788241.shtml 
6 US Bureau of Census (2018). “US Trade China”, 2018. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html 
7 Ibid	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continue. President Trump actually threatened to escalate the trade conflict to a full scale war by 
imposing tariffs on all imported goods from China.8 
China and the US are the two largest economies in the world. The bilateral trade of the two 
nations amounted to $635 billion. Compared with Japanese-US trade friction in 1980, the scale 
of the Sino-US trade war is much larger and more dangerous: not only has it been undermining 
the growth and stability of the two national economies, it has also been raising the risk to the 
stability of the world economy. If the war were to continue, it might trigger an economic 
recession in China, which is facing a number of economic challenges, such as sky-rocketing 
housing prices, mounting debt in both public and private sectors, and weakening momentum of 
domestic investment and consumption.  
 
2. What are the Two Countries Fighting For? 
Fair Trade vs China’s Developing Country Status 
President Trump has repeatedly claimed that trade between China and the US is unfair, because 
US tariffs on Chinese products are much lower than those that China has imposed on American 
goods. For example, the US charges a 2.5% tariff on Chinese cars while China taxes American 
cars at 25%. This asymmetric tariff structure has given the advantage to Chinese exports entering 
the US market, but it has hindered American products’ access to the Chinese market. In other 
words, the openness of the two markets is unbalanced. Chinese market is relatively more closed 
than that of the US. That unfair trade is one of the major reasons driving the growth of the US 
trade deficit with China.9  
According to the estimates by the World Bank,10 the average tariff of China in 2016 was 10.9% 
much higher than the 3.57% level of the US.  China’s tariffs on consumer products are even 
higher, more than 15% before China unilaterally cut them on July 1, 2018. In addition, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Lambert, L (2018). “Trump threatens tariffs on all $500 billion of Chinese imports”, Reuters, 20 July 2018. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china/trump-threatens-tariffs-on-all-500-billion-of-chinese-imports-
idUSKBN1KA18Q 
9White House (2018). “President Donald J. Trump is confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies”, 29 May 2018. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-confronting-chinas-unfair-trade-policies/ 
10 World Development Indicator, World Bank, 2018	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Chinese government has been utilizing non-tariff barriers, such as standards, licenses and 
documentations, to hinder the importation of foreign goods. President Trump stated “We cannot 
continue to let people come into our country and rob us blind and charge us tremendous tariffs 
and taxes and we charge them nothing.”11 
President Trump insisted on defining fair trade as reciprocity, meaning that China should not 
levy higher tariffs on American goods than those charged by the US on Chinese products12. As a 
response to that US demand, the Chinese government slashed tariffs on thousands of consumer 
goods on July 1, 2018.13 Now, the Chinese tariff on automobiles is 15%, still higher than the 2.5% 
levied by the US on equivalent products. Again, on November 1, 2018, the Chinese government 
unilaterally reduced tariffs on thousands of intermediate inputs. 
The Chinese government disagrees with the defining of fair trade as reciprocity, arguing that the 
tariffs of a country should be designed according to its level of economic development, insisting 
that China remains a developing country.  It is “unreasonable and unrealistic” to demand that 
China adopts tariffs which reciprocal to those of the US.  As a member of the WTO, China has 
no obligation to offer reciprocity to developed countries.14 
It is true that the WTO agreement contains “special and different provisions”, offering special 
rights to developing countries. WTO provisions state that developed countries should not expect 
developing countries to provide reciprocal tariff reduction in trade negotiations. That is why 
tariffs in developing countries are generally higher than in developed countries. Those special 
provisions are intended to promote the participation of developing countries in international trade 
and enhance their access to the global market.15 However, the WTO does not provided a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Shepardson, D (2018). “U.S. to push for reciprocal tax on trade partners: Trump”, Reuters, 13 February 2018. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-trade/u-s-to-push-for-reciprocal-tax-on-trade-partners-trump-idUSKBN1FW22Q 
12 Morgan, D (2017). “Trump objects to terminology of border adjustment tax”, Reuters, 13 April 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-tax-idUSKBN17E2DM 
13 State Council (2018). “News press held by The State Council Information Office on the reduction of tariffs of imported 
consumer goods”, 2018. http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/201806/t20180601_2915138.htm 
14 Qing Ying (2018). “Ministry of Commerce: Reciprocal Tariffs are neither Making Sense nor Reasonable, Caixin, April, 12, 
2018 
http://international.caixin.com/2018-04-12/101233416.html 
15 WTO (2018). “Special and differential treatment provisions”, WTO, 2018. 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.ht 
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definition of “developing country.” Any WTO member can self-declare “developing” status. 
Once a country is assigned “developing” status, it will remain a developing country forever, 
regardless of its economic development. That is why even today Korea, Singapore and Israel are 
still “developing” countries under the WTO.  
When China joined the WTO in 2001, its GDP was $1.34 trillion and its GDP per capita was 
slightly more than $1,000. China declared itself “a developing country” and was accepted as a 
developing country member of the WTO. After almost two decades of high growth, China has 
become the second largest economy, with $12.8 trillion GDP and the largest exporting nation in 
the world. A critical question is whether China should continue to be treated as a developing 
country in the global trading system.  
The debate about China’s developing country status is not new. In a speech delivered at China’s 
Development Forum 2013, Pascal Lamy, former Director General of the WTO, stated that  
“China should do much more than other poor and weak economies and should not use its 
developing country status as a cover to avoid taking more international obligations.16 That is one 
of the focal points of the Sino-US trade dispute. Automatically giving up “developing” status 
means China should shoulder more responsibilities in terms of opening its domestic market to 
foreign goods.   
The World Bank has designated $12,700 per capita as the high income country threshold.  By the 
World Bank standard, China has not yet achieved the status of high-income country. That 
standard is often cited in debates as a justification of China’s developing country status. The 
world trading system, however, is governed by the WTO, not the World Bank.  Using the 
standard of the World Bank is a questionable motion. 
WTO’s special provisions for developing countries are designed to facilitate exports from 
developing countries, which are not competitive and have difficulties accessing the world market. 
China has surpassed Japan, Germany and the US to emerge as the largest exporting nation in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Lamy, P (2013). “China should be more active in global economic governance,” WTO, 2013 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl274_e.htm 
7	  
	  
world. In 2017, its annual exports totaled $2.2 trillion, much higher than those of the 28 
European Union (EU) countries ($1.98 trillion) and the US ($1.57 trillion).17 
Not only does China rank as the world No.1 exporter of labor intensive products, it is also the 
No.1 exporter of high-tech products in the world. In 2017, China recorded a $127 billion trade 
surplus with the US in advanced technology products. The Chinese yuan has been included in the 
special drawing rights (SDR) of the IMF, along with the US dollar, the Japanese yen, British 
pound and euro. The Chinese yuan is the only currency of a developing country included in the 
SDR basket. In recent years, China initiated and funded the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank and BRICS Development Bank. From 2000 to 2014, the overseas investment of the 
Chinese government totaled $3543 billion, just $40 billion less than that of the US, the largest 
donor of official development assistance in the world.18  
All of these impressive economic achievements indicate that China has grown to be a great 
economic power. Within the WTO, however, China continues to enjoy tremendous benefits and 
advantages of poor countries. It is natural and reasonable that China’s developing country status 
be questioned and challenged by the US. Larry Kudlow said “China is a first-world economy, 
behaving like a third-world economy.” The largest exporting nation in the world, China is 
insisting on maintaining its developing nation status, which contradicts the objectives of the 
WTO special provisions. It is now time that China becomes a more equal partner in international 
trade with developed countries.  
Forced Technology Transfer vs “Market for Technology” Practices 
In addition to the debate about fair trade and reciprocal tariffs, the Trump administration accused 
China of intellectual property theft and forcing American companies to transfer their 
technologies to their Chinese partners.19 In March of 2018, the USTR released the 301 report on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 WTO (2018). “Who are the developing countries in the WTO?”, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.ht 
18 William & Mary (2018). “China’s Global Development Footprint”, AIDDATE, 2018. 
https://www.aiddata.org/china 
19 White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (2018). “How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the 
technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World”, June 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf	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China’s acts, policies and practices related to technology, intellectual property and innovation.20 
The 301 report documents a few cases of forced technology transfers. One is related to the 
transfer of new energy vehicle (NEV) technologies. The Chinese government only subsidizes 
domestically produced NEVs, not imported ones. To enter the fasting growing Chinese NEV 
market, foreign NEV producers have to set up joint-ventures with Chinese partners. The Chinese 
government requires that, joint-ventures should own at least one of three technologies (battery, 
driving system and control system) to receive the NEV subsidy. In 2017, the Chinese 
government made it compulsory for joint-ventures to have the intellectual property of all three 
technologies to receive the subsidy. In short, transferring technologies from foreign companies to 
the joint ventures, where Chinese partners typically hold 51% of shares, is a requirement for 
foreign auto-makers to enter Chinese NEV market.  
Another example is related to the procurement of the C919, a large passenger airplane developed 
by Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (Comac). China has emerged as the largest market 
for large passenger aircrafts, which until now has been monopolized by Boeing and Airbus. 
Developing the capacity to manufacture large aircrafts has been a top priority of China’s 
industrial policy. In the age of global value chains, it is not necessary that all parts and 
components of the Comac 919 be produced by Chinese companies. Comac has sourced many 
C919 parts and components from foreign suppliers. For example, the engines of the C919 are 
supplied by the American company General Electronics (GE). However, Comac requested 
foreign companies to set up joint-ventures in China in order to quality as suppliers of the C919. 
The Trump administration regards this situation as a case of forced technology transfer. 
Technology transfer agreements have been a feature of China’s strategic approach to foreign 
investment since China opened up trade with the rest of the world in the early 1980s. In many 
industries, Chinese authorities allow foreign investors access to the Chinese market only if the 
foreign party agrees to form a joint-venture with a local firm.  This practice is referred as 
“market for technology,” adopted as an effective means for Chinese companies to learn advanced 
technologies from their foreign partners. Volkswagen’s entry into the Chinese automobile market 
through its alliance with Shanghai Auto Company is a typical example.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 USTR (2018). “Findings of the investigation into China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, 
intellectual property, and innovation undersection 301 of the trade act of 1974”, 22 March 2018.  
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF 
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When China joined the WTO in 2001, the Chinese government promised not to use technology 
transfer as a prerequisite for approval of the importation of foreign goods or foreign 
investment.21  From the point view of the Trump administration, given its entry into the WTO, 
China should stop requiring foreign investors to enter partnerships with Chinese companies. 
Continuously imposing joint-venture requirement as a necessary condition for accessing the 
Chinese market violates China’s WTO commitment. The 301 report claims that the technology 
transfer that accompanies such partnership is unfair to American companies and deprives them 
of the right to earn market-based royalties. 
The Chinese government refutes all accusations of forced technology transfer and stealing 
intellectual property. It claims that technology transfer from foreign investors to Chinese partners 
constitutes pure business decisions and is mutually beneficial.22 Dong Yan, the Director of the 
Institute of the World Economy and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Science, argued that 
there are no Chinese laws demanding foreign investors to transfer their technologies to Chinese 
partners.23 On the other hand, it is mysterious that neither Chinese government officials and nor 
Chinese scholars have ever challenged any specific cases cited in the 301 reports. 
Market Distortion of Subsidies and Industrial Policy 
Industrial policy has played a critical role in the nurturing of China’s industrial capacities. The 
Chinese government, including both the central and local governments, has proactively applied 
various industrial policies to support the development of strategic industries, notably NEVs, 
photovoltaic solar panels and flat-panel displays. Fiscal subsidies, preferential tax treatments, 
and commercial loans with interest rates lower than market rates are common policy instruments 
for the encouragement of investment and the expansion of Chinese companies in targeted 
industries. Prof. Justin Yifu Lin of Peking University, former vice president of the World Bank, 
has long been a vocal supporter of China’s industry policy. He argues that industry policy is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid. 
22 “Ministry of Commerce: US accusations of forced technology and intellectual property theft contradict historic facts and are 
not acceptable”, Xinhuanet, 12 July 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-07/12/c_1123118652.htm 
23 Qi, Z. (2018). “The US accusation of forced technology transfers is groundless”. 9 April 2018. 
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0409/c1004-29912963.html	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essential for the government of middle-income countries to efficiently allocate scarce resources 
and facilitate technological innovation and industrial upgrading. He claims that the government 
has necessary information and capacity to identify the industries compatible with the 
comparative advantage of the country.24  
In 2015, China’s State Council25 launched Made in China 2025, an official document that 
outlines a blueprint for the Chinese industry policy for the next ten years. It emphasizes the 
development of future oriented industries: integrated circuits, artificial intelligence, robotics, 
biotechnology, aerospace equipment, new energy vehicles and new materials, and aims to 
achieve 40% self-sufficiency in the core parts and basic materials of those industries by 2020 and 
70% self-sufficiency by 2025.  
In a competitive market, government subsidies of exports tend to worsen national welfare. 
However, if an international market is not competitive, then the incumbent firms of the market 
can earn rents. So, it is welfare enhancing for a national government to use fiscal subsidies to 
help its firms enter the market and compete with existing players. This is referred as “strategic 
trade policy” by Brander and Spencer.26 The success of Airbus is often cited as remarkable 
evidence for the efficacy of “strategic trade policy.” Having received more than $22 billion in 
subsidies from the European Union,27 Airbus finally broke the monopoly of Boeing and grew 
into to a capable competitor in the large passenger aircraft market.  
Generally speaking, incumbent firms that cannot obtain subsidies are victims of “strategic trade 
policy.”  Many American companies lead the technology frontiers of the industries targeted by 
Made in China 2025, and have been monopolizing the international markets of those industries. 
For instance, Intel and ADM monopolize personal computer CPUs and Qualcomm dominates the 
market for chipsets embedded in Android system mobile phones.  With government subsidies, 
Chinese firms could catch up with leading American firms, thus undermining the monopoly of 
American companies and eroding their global maker shares.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Lin, J. Y (2017). “New Structural Economics and Industrial Policies for Catching-Up Economies”, in Advances in the Theory 
and Practice of Smart Specialization, ed. S. Radosevic, et al, pp. 183-199. 
25 State Council (2015). “Made in China 2025”, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm 
26 Brander, J and Spencer, B (1985). “Export subsidies and international market rivalry”, Journal of International Economics, 
1985. 
27 Boeing (2016). “Boeing Statement on WTO Ruling”, 2016.	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Integrated circuits (IC), including CPUs and IC chips of mobile phones, are at the top of the 
agenda of Made in China 2025. The Chinese government has allocated huge financial resources 
to the facilitation of technological innovation in the sector. It is estimated that the pool of IC 
investment funds totals 730 billion yuan, of which 140 billion yuan is committed by the central 
government, 240 billion by local governments and 350 billion by firms and venture capital.28 The 
US government has neither the financial resources to match the Chinese subsidy, nor the legal 
authority to promote a particular industry. Faced with competition from Chinese firms backed by 
massive government subsidies, American companies may struggle to maintain their 
technological leadership and dominance in the global market. The Trump administration claims 
that Chinese industry policy and subsidies are harmful to US industry, as it could give Chinese 
companies a huge advantage over American companies and distort market competition. The 
massive subsidies may eventually lead to excess capacity and result in the dumping of Chinese 
products in the global market.29 
Figure 1 Share of the China’s Flat-Panel Display Market by Country (%) 
  
Source: Sturgeon, Taglinio and Thun (2018). 
A joint study on the development of flat panels in China, shows that the state-led development 
strategy for nurturing the Chinese TV flat-panel industry has been very successful. In 2010, 
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foreign companies from Japan, Korea and Taiwan basically monopolized the Chinese market for 
flat-panel displays. Thanks to massive local government subsidies and various preferential 
policies, by 2018, Chinese firms, most of them state-owned enterprises, built up a large capacity 
for TV flat-panel production and gained 21% of market share at the expense of their foreign 
rivals. Japanese firms were completely edged out of the market (Figure 1).30 
The Trump administration alleges that China’s industrial policy and subsidies constitute unfair 
trade practice and the agenda of Made in China 2025 is a planned economic aggression towards 
the US and the world economy.31 It urges China to drop Made in China 2025. It is not clear 
whether the Chinese government will shelve Made in China 2025 to alleviate trade frictions. 
However, reports on and discussions of Made in China 2025, have disappeared from the Chinese 
media. This may indicate that the Chinese government is attempting to lower the profile of its 
industrial policy to ease US concerns. 
 
3. Social and Economic Changes in American Society behind the Trade War 
China’s unfair practices, alleged by the Trump administration, have been prevailing even since 
China’s entry into the WTO. Neither the Clinton administration nor the Obama administration 
took confrontation approaches to force China to change its course. Why does the Trump 
administration regard these issues as major problems for the bilateral trade relations, and even 
resort to a trade war?  The winds of the change are fundamentally rooted in social and economic 
changes in American society in the last few decades.  
Huge US Trade Deficit with China 
The US trade deficit with China has risen sharply since China joined the WTO. In 2001, it was 
$83 billion, about 19.7% of the total US trade deficit. By 2017, it surged to $375.6 billion, 
accounting for 46.5% of the total trade deficit (Figure 2).  The Trump administration blames 
unfair Chinese trade practices for the huge bilateral trade deficit and is requesting China to lower 
its tariff and non-tariff barriers so American companies can have equal access to the Chinese 
market.  
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Figure 2. US Trade Deficits with China and Japan (billion dollar) 
 
Source: US Bureau of Census. 
However, Chinese scholars and government official disagree.  They insist that structural reasons 
rather than China’s protectionism and mercantilist policy are driving the huge trade imbalance. 
The low savings rate in the US and the “Triffin Dilemma” are the two commonly cited structure 
reasons. The low savings rate is assumed to drive Americans to consume beyond their means, 
and the “Triffin Dilemma” implies that the US trade deficit should be permanent and continue to 
rise, since the US should channel sufficient dollar liquidity through trade deficits to support the 
international financial system, centered on the US dollar.  
However, using the low savings rate and “Triffin Dilemma” to explain the US trade deficit with 
China is a fundamentally flawed argument. Theoretically, low savings rate may be a major 
reason behind overall US trade deficit, but not necessarily the reason for the bilateral trade deficit 
with China.  Low savings rate cannot explain why almost half of the US trade deficit ends up 
with China.  In other words, low savings rate argument cannot explain the disproportion 
distribution of US trade deficit to its trade with China. Furthermore, the ratio of US trade deficit 
to GDP changed little from 2001 to 2017. The ratio in 2001 was 4.0% and rose slightly to 4.2% 
after 16 years. If low savings rate was one of major factors responsible for the bilateral trade 
deficit, US trade deficit with China should rise proportionally to US GDP. However, it jumped 
more than fourfold from 2001 to 2017, greatly outpacing US GDP growth. 
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The Triffin dilemma is a critique to the Breton Woods System. Under the Breton Woods System, 
the US dollar was designated as the only currency for international transactions. All other 
countries pegged their currencies to the US dollar, with the dollar backed by gold at the fixed 
price $35 per ounce gold. Thus, the US had an obligation to supply dollar liquidity to the world 
economy.  Having a current account deficit would then be inevitable for the US. If it eliminated 
the balance of payments deficit, it would deprive global trade of the international liquidity.32 
In 1971, President Nixon abandoned the Bretton Woods System and unilaterally cancelled the 
convertibility of the US dollar to gold. Since then, the world economy has moved into the regime 
of free floating exchange rates.  The US no longer has the obligation to provide dollar liquidity to 
the rest of the world. Besides the US dollar, there are now other currency choices for settling 
international trade. The British pound, the Deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc, and 
now the euro, all have been used for international transactions. Even if the Triffin dilemma was 
one of the reasons for the US trade deficit, it would be difficult to explain why almost most half 
of the necessary dollar liquidity flew to China. 
In fact, global value chains are the only structural factor that could partly explain why almost 
half of US trade deficit originated from its trade with China.  In recent decades, China has been 
used as an assembly center for various manufacturing products sold in the US market. For 
example, all iPhones sold to American consumers are first assembled in China and then shipped 
to the US. To assemble iPhones, China imports a lot of intermediate inputs from third countries, 
such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Germany. The value of these intermediates becomes part of 
China’s trade surplus to the US. A substantial share of China’s trade surplus with the US is in 
fact a transfer from third countries.33 
Declining US Manufacturing Industry 
The manufacturing industry plays a crucial role in the nurturing of the middle class in 
industrialized countries. Jobs in the manufacturing industry offer steady wage increases and 
stable fringe benefits because of productivity growth. By working in factories, even workers 
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without college degrees can achieve the dream of middle class—having a house and a car. 
However, the number of US manufacturing jobs shrank sharply. From 1999 to 2011, the US lost 
5.8 million manufacturing jobs. Imports from China are blamed in part for the elimination of US 
manufacturing jobs. According to Autor, Horn and Hanson,34 imports from China directly 
resulted in the loss of 550,000 manufacturing jobs.  Including all indirect effects of Chinese 
imports, such as linkage and consumption effects, China’s imports destroyed 2.4 million US jobs 
from 1999 to 2011. Those findings were published in the most prestigious economic journal, 
“American Economic Review” (AER), in an article titled “The China Syndrome: Local Labor 
Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” To date, citations of that paper have 
exceeded 1600.  
In 2016, AER published another paper, “Surprisingly Swift Decline of Manufacturing Jobs in the 
US” by Pierce and Schott.35 The authors found that granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
to China, which eliminated potential tariff increases on Chinese imports, significantly 
contributed to a sharp decline in US manufacturing jobs. Industries more exposed to the change 
experienced greater employment loss and increased imports from China. The paper was cited 
almost 500 times in just two years. 
American society has been debating the benefits and costs of trade with China for a long time. In 
2004, US Public Broadcasting Service aired an one-hour program “Is Wal-Mart Good for 
America?.”36  It emphasized the job losses linked to the import of cheap Chinese goods by Wal-
Mart, the largest retailer in the US (with more 4,000 stores and accounting for almost 10% of US 
imports from China). Robert Scoot,37 a researcher at the Economic Policy Institute, estimates that 
Wal-Mart imports from China caused the loss of 400,000 US jobs. Prof. Peter Navarro, Assistant 
to President Trump and the Director of Trade and Industrial Policy of the White House, 
published a well-known book “Death by China: How America Lost its Manufacturing Base,” in 
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which he accused Chinese imports of stealing American jobs and damaging the US 
manufacturing industry.  
Because of the methodological flaws of these studies, US academics had rarely echoed those 
studies’ criticism of the importation of Chinese goods. The publication of the above two articles 
in AEA signals a change in American academic opinion on Sino-US trade. The detrimental 
effects of Chinese imports on US employment have been gradually recognized and are now 
taking center stage in US academics.  
Rising Income Disparity 
Income disparity in the US has been a serious social problem. It has divided the American 
society. Most of the newly generated wealth of recent decades had been pocketed by the top 1%, 
or even the top 0.1% of Americans.38  Many factors have contributed to the widening of income 
disparity between poor and rich, as exemplified by super-managers with multi-million dollar 
annual salaries, stock options, and higher returns on capital than the rate of economic growth. 
Globalization driven by trade liberalization and free capital mobility has also contributed 
substantially to the increase in income disparity in the US. Globalization primarily benefits the 
owners of capital, who can allocate their capital globally, and workers who are able to immigrate 
either legally or illegally to nations with high income. Workers who are not mobile, but have to 
produce goods competing with cheap imports, are the losers of globalization.   
Efficiency and equity are the two objectives of resource allocation. In any economy, those two 
objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously without compromise. The unprecedented 
globalization since 1990s mainly improved the efficiency of resource allocation. As a 
consequence, equity has been compromised. Income disparity in the US has risen to a record 
high, almost matching that of the period before World War Two. From 1972 to 2013, the average 
annual income of the top 10% of Americans increased 70%, from $161,000 to $273,00. In 
contrast, the other 90% Americans saw their average annual income fall 15%, from $35,411 to 
$31,652. A Pew Research Center survey on the wealth of American families reveals a similar 
divergence between the top rich and the rest.  From 1983 to 2013, the average wealth of the top 
21% American families doubled from $318,100 to $639,400; the average wealth of the middle 
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46% of families remained roughly constant, rising slightly from $94,300 to $96,500. In the same 
period, the wealth of the bottom 33% shrank to $9,300 from $11,400.39 
Globalization is identified as one of factors driving down the minimum wage and the average 
wage of US manufacturing workers, in turn suppressing the income growth of low and middle 
income families and worsening income disparity. In 2013 the median real hourly wage of 
American automobile workers was $15.83, some three dollars less than ten years ago; during the 
period of 1979 to 2009, the real minimum wage fell from $8.38 to $7.25 per hour. Import 
competition and inflows of legal and illegal immigrants largely attributed to that fall in the real 
wages.40 
More than a half century ago, Stolper and Samuelson41 published “Protection and Real Wages” 
in the Review of Economic Studies. The paper demonstrates theoretically that, free trade, which 
generates net benefits for a country as a whole, always creates winners and losers, thus widening 
income disparity. When a nation opens to trade, even after taking relatively cheap imports into 
account, the real wage of workers in the sector competing with imports falls. The workers are the 
losers in international trade. Stolper and Samuelson suggest that tariffs could protect those losers. 
President Trump won the presidential election largely because of the votes of the losers left 
behind by globalization.  
President Trump Promotes “America First” 
During his presidential campaign, President Trump promised to American voters that American 
First would be the principle of his presidency. On September. 17, 2017, President Trump 
addressed the 72nd annual UN general Assembly in New York. He announced his American 
First policy to leaders from all of the world. He stated that, “as President of the United States, I 
will always put America first”, and “The United States will forever be a great friend to the world, 
and especially to its allies. But we can no longer be taken advantage of, or enter into a one-sided 
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deal where the United States gets nothing in return. As long as I hold this office, I will defend 
America’s interests above all else.”42 
The American Frist implies that President Trump cannot accept or tolerate any unfair trade rules 
and agreements. He has taken a series of unilateral actions to address the “unfairness” in 
international trade agreements. On day one at the White House, President Trump withdrew from 
TPP because it was a “bad” deal for America; he requested the re-negotiation of NAFTA, “the 
worst trade deal the US ever signed”; and ordered the 301 investigation of China’s unfair 
practices related to technology transfer and intellectual property, and took its outcomes as 
legitimate reasons for the US to initiate a trade war.  
President Trump also threatened to quit the World Trade Organization (WTO) if it did not treat 
the US better.43 Of the 164 countries in the WTO, the US has the most open market and its 
average tariffs are the lowest. The US has huge trade deficits with its major trading partners, 
namely Japan, China and the EU, all of whom impose higher tariffs than the US on average. US 
market is indispensable for all other WTO members. Ironically, the WTO operates on one nation 
one vote rule. The voting power of the US is the same as that of any other member, no matter 
how small its economy. Even worse, to make any changes in WTO rules, consensus among the 
members is required. This implies that any member has de facto veto power. Reforming the 
WTO under the US initiatives is almost impossible.  
The Trump administration is resorting to unilateral actions against its trading partners to reshape 
the global trading system because of its frustration with and disappointment in the WTO.  In 
1971, President Nixon exited the Breton Woods system as the US could no longer afford to 
redeem the dollar held by foreign governments with gold at the fixed price $35/ounce.  Nixon’s 
action shocked the world and prompted the collapse of the gold system. Today, the unilateral 
actions of the Trump administration have marginalized the WTO. A US withdraw from the WTO 
would severely cripple the post-World War II multilateral trading system originally through the 
US initiative.  
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4 Risks of the Trade War to the Chinese Economy 
Tariffs raise the burdens of consumers and reduce their welfare.  The US has started collecting 
tariffs on $250 billion in Chinese goods while China doing the same on $110 billion in American 
goods.  Neither China nor the US would be immune to the detrimental effects of such a tit-for-tat 
trade war. There is no doubt that this emerging trade war is hurting both economies.  The longer 
the trade war lasts, the higher the damage will be. The trade war is surely a lose-lose scenario. 
ZTE, China’s second largest maker of telecommunication equipment, is a noteworthy victim of 
the trade war. Amid rising trade tension between the US and China, the Trump administration 
announced a ban preventing American companies from selling components to ZTE. American-
made microchips and software are essential for ZTE to manufacture its products, so the ban 
triggered the halt of ZTE stock trading and put the company’s survival in question. After 
intensive negotiations between the governments of the two countries, the Trump administration 
lifted the ban, but requested that ZTE to pay a $1 billion penalty, put $400 million in escrow with 
an American bank and allow a team of American compliance monitors to supervise ZTE’s 
operations for 10 years.44  
The trade war also hit China’s stock markets. The confidence of Chinese investors has been 
severely undermined by the uncertainty of the trade war. The index of Shanghai stock exchange 
broke the resilience threshold of 3,000 and fell below 2,700, plunging more than 20% since its 
peak in late January of 2018.  The Shanghai Stock Exchange lost its title of second largest stock 
exchange to Tokyo stock exchange. Moreover, the Chinese yuan suffered from spillover from 
the trade-war. China’s trade surplus with the US accounted for 85% of its overall trade surplus. 
The trade war will definitely worsen China’s trade balance and exert a pressure on the yuan. The 
yuan weakened by almost 10% against the dollar to 6.90 yuan from a high of 6.28 in March. To 
some extent, the depreciation reflects market expectation of an evolving Sino-US trade war. 
Steady depreciation of the yuan may provoke capital outflows and endanger China’s fragile 
financial system, so maintaining the stability of the yuan has been a top priority of the Chinese 
government.  
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It is clear that China would lose much more than the US, because China has a $375 billion trade 
surplus with the US. Moreover, China’s exports to the US accounted for 2.7% of its GDP, while 
US exports to China amounted to about 0.7% of its GDP. Relatively speaking, the Chinese 
economy is more dependent on the US market than vice versa. 
China has been functioning as an assembly center of manufacturing products for the global 
market. A substantial portion of China’s imports from the US has nothing to do with China’s 
domestic demand, serving rather as intermediate inputs of exports. For instance, China imported 
$230 billion in IC chips from the US in 2015.  Most of those imported IC chips were used for 
making iPhones, Sony digital cameras and Dell computers, all destined for foreign markets. On 
the other hand, China’s exports to the US, such as textile products and ICTs products are final 
goods consumed by American consumers. This asymmetric dependence suggests that the 
Chinese economy is more vulnerable than the US to the trade war.  
Many Chinese firms export goods to the US via global value chains (GVCs) led by foreign 
multinational firms. The Chinese firms simply receive orders to produce items demanded by lead 
firms of GVCs. The Chinese firms do not decide what to produce, where to sell it, or how to 
price their exports. If there are alternative factories in other countries, such as Vietnam, 
Indonesia, or India, which can produce the same products at comparable costs, the 25% tariff 
imposed on Chinese goods will prompt lead firms of GVCs to seek alternative suppliers in third 
countries and reduce their orders from China.  
The Japanese company Mitsubishi Electronics used its Chinese subsidiary to produce machinery 
for the American market. To avoid US tariffs, it has decided to relocate part of its production 
facilities in China back to Japan. Asahi Kasei, one of the largest Japanese chemical firms, has 
also reshored the Chinese subsidiary (that had been serving the US market) back to Japan.45 
Many foreign companies have been employing China as an export platform to serve the US 
market. If the trade war continues, it is highly likely that more and more foreign companies will 
either move back home or to third countries. 
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Will the trade war stop?  Or, will it escalate to a full scale war with both sides levying tariffs on 
all imports from each other?  Will the Chinese government target American companies with 
operations in China? These questions are already discouraging future foreign investment in 
China, and even worse, induce the relocation of foreign firms already in China to third countries. 
The uncertainty of the trade war is difficult to quantify, but the war could easily lead to cascade 
effects. 
 
5. Rational Choices for China to Deal with the Trade War	  
Negotiation not Retaliation 
Trade wars are always initiated by countries with trade deficits.  It is not surprising that the US, 
which has a $375 billion trade deficit with China, fired the first shot in the ongoing Sino-US 
trade war. The aggression of the US should not be considered a sufficient reason for China to 
retaliate and carry on with tit-for-tat strategy. The experience of Japan in dealing with trade 
disputes with the US in the 1980s shows that proactive negotiations are a better choice than tit-
for-tat strategy. In 1981, the American auto industry was mired in recession. Rising imports of 
Japanese cars prompted protectionism against Japan. In response to US criticism against the 
rapid growth of Japanese car imports, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) initiated “voluntary exports restraint” (VER) and set an annual limit of 1.68 million units. 
The VER effectively alleviated the concerns of US auto industry, a major force behind the 
protectionism.46  
As US trade deficit with Japan continued to rise, US trade friction with Japan escalated. The 
Reagan administration requested that Japan boosted its domestic demand by means of structural 
reforms and opening Japanese market to American companies through trade liberalization. The 
Nakasone administration set up many bilateral committees with US counterparts. Each 
committee focused on one industry, of which the US had complained about trade barriers. 
Because those committees failed to make any significant progress, former prime minister 
Nakasone proposed the appreciation of the yen as a solution. It was expected that yen 
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appreciation would be able to correct the bilateral imbalance between the two nations. The 
Regan administration agreed to Nakasone’s proposal, which eventually led to “Plaza Accord”, a 
famous agreement among US, Japan, UK, France and Germany for a joint intervention in foreign 
exchange markets to drive down the value of the US dollar. The intervention brought a sharp 
appreciation of the yen against the US dollar and instigated the age of clean floating of the yen.47 
Debate remains as to whether the VER and the Plaza Accord effectively decreased US trade 
deficit with Japan. However, these initiatives surely prevented trade disputes from escalating into 
a trade war and effectively mitigated the tensions between the two nations. In recent decades, 
China has benefited tremendously from trade with the US, now the largest market for Chinese 
exports. Millions of jobs were created by Sino-US trade. It is in China’s best interest to actively 
pursue negotiations with the US and prevent further escalation of the war. Apparently, tit-for-tat 
engagement is more damaging than constructive negotiation. As a matter of fact, if the Chinese 
government did not retaliate for the 25% US tariff imposed on the first $50 billion in Chinese 
goods, there would be no legitimate reasons for the Trump administration to levy 10% on other 
$200 billion in Chinese goods. 
Further Opening the Domestic Market 
When China entered the WTO in 2001, admitted as a developing country, it was seen as 
acceptable that China applied various trade instruments, such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, to 
shelter its domestic industries from foreign competition. Now, China has grown into the largest 
exporting country in the world, and “Made in China” products have successfully penetrated 
almost every corner of the global market. It is time for China to fulfill its responsibility to 
promote trade liberalization by further opening its domestic market, to imports from other 
countries. 
Despite $1.84 trillion in imports to China in 2017, most of which are natural resources and 
intermediate inputs, foreign access to the Chinese consumer goods market remains very limited. 
In 2017, China imported $65.7 billion in consumer goods, about 3.6% of its total imports.48 On 
average, consumer goods import per capita was just $47, much less than $198 for ASEAN 
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countries and $996 for the US (Figure 3). It is estimated that China’s domestic retail sales 
(reaching $5.7 trillion in 2017) have surpassed those in the US. However, China’s import of 
consumer goods accounted for a merely 1.15% of retail sales. Chinese tourists’ zealous shopping 
behavior overseas and the popularity of parallel trade among Chinese consumers suggest a 
shortage of foreign consumer goods in the Chinese market. There is great potential for China to 
further open its home market to foreign goods. It is time for Chinese consumers to embrace 
“Made beyond China.” The Trump administration’s demand for fair trade and reciprocity 
actually aims to open the Chinese market to American products. 
Figure 3 Imports of Consumer Goods per Capita (US Dollar) 
 
Source: the author’s calculation and Thorbecke (2016) 
 
A large but closed home market is meaningless to foreign producers. If and only if China opens 
its market to the rest of world, the size of the Chinese market can be used as a bargaining power 
at trade negotiation tables. The Trump administration confidently launched trade wars against 
both China and its major allies, simply because US market is the most open and is indispensable 
to those countries. Hank Greenberg, founding chairman and CEO of American International 
Group, writing in the Wall Street Journal, publicly advised Chinese leaders in the Wall Street 
Journal, “you can’t expect to keep receiving favorable trade and investment terms unless you 
reciprocate.” Mr. Greenberg has been a long-time friend of China and supportive of China’s 
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entry into the WTO.  Regarding the Sino-US trade war, he commented “It is in China’s interest 
to reform, the US is right to press to level the playing field.”49  
The Chinese government has unilaterally slashed its tariffs twice. China could do more to lower 
tariffs, for instance cutting its tariff on automobiles to 10% or even lower and reducing its tariff 
on American beef. In addition to tariffs, non-tariff barriers remain a major obstacle to imports. 
Regulations and documentations for governing the imports of foreign food, cosmetics and 
pharmaceutical products are badly in need of simplification. Google, Facebook and Twitter are 
not available in China. Protecting national security is a legitimate reason to ban these digital 
services in China. Given the monopoly of Baidu and Tencent in China’s domestic market, there 
is a question as to whether the “national security” argument actually functions as a non-tariff 
barrier to foreign digital service providers. Gradually lifting the ban on foreign digital service 
providers, among whom the US has a comparative advantage, would ease the tension between 
the two nations. 
Strengthening Economic Integration with Japan and the EU  
Besides the US, Japan and the EU are also important markets for Chinese exports. Strengthening 
economic relations with Japan and the EU would reduce China’s dependence on the US market 
and act as a counter to the protective measures of the US.  Many Japanese and European 
companies are rivals of American companies. If Japanese and European companies could enjoy 
preferential treatment in the Chinese market, they would gain an advantage in the competition 
with American companies, which could pressure the Trump administration to soften its stand on 
the Sino-US trade disputes.  
After President Trump withdrew the US from TPP, Japan turned to the EU and signed the Japan-
EU Economic Partnership agreement, which removes 99% of Japanese tariffs on EU products 
and 94% of EU tariffs on Japanese imports. The agreement opens the EU market to Japanese 
automobiles and the Japanese market to beef, dairy products and wines from the EU. That 
agreement may encourage the US return to multilateral trade negotiations, such as TPP.  
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The Japan-EU agreement abolishes most of the protection of the Japanese agriculture sector, 
trading the interests of Japanese farmers for those of auto workers. Japanese famers are the losers 
in the agreement; they had been loyal supporters of the incumbent party—Japan’s Liberal 
Democratic party (LDP). Politically it was very risky for the Abe administration to betray the 
LDP’s long-term loyal constituents. This is the cost that the Abe administration has to pay for 
pursuing access to alternative markets and implicitly counterbalancing the US withdrawal from 
TPP.  
A China-EU FTA and a China-Japan-Korea FTA are both possible options for China to 
counterbalance the pressures of the US. To achieve these objectives, China should make 
substantial concessions in terms of opening its domestic market. The China-Japan-Korea FTA 
(CJK) has been delayed for a long time because of deteriorated bilateral political relations 
between China and Japan. Conclusion of If CJK would form a free trade block covering the three 
largest economies of Asia. This would offer an alternative for China to expand its overseas 
market, and to attract investment and acquire advanced technology.  
 
 
 
 
 
